LAB 45

LABORATORIUM INDONESIA 2045

SIX GENERATIONS OF TERRORISM

How Indonesia Got to Zero, 1949–2026

TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM IN INDONESIA

Since December 2022, Indonesia has had no terrorist bombing and no armed attack by a terrorist network. This deck tells how that happened: six generations of terrorists over seven decades, and how Indonesia learned — often too late — to answer each one.

THE ARGUMENT IN ONE PARAGRAPH

Every generation had different leaders, groups and schools — the jungle, Afghanistan, Mindanao, Syria, and now the phone. What connects them is an idea: a violent, extreme ideology. For seventy years Indonesia was one step behind, fighting rebels with soldiers, cells with intelligence and bombers with police. Only when it chose the law over war, prevention over reaction, and began to fight the idea itself did the attacks stop. No country can keep zero alone.

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I · ZERO — THE QUESTION

Four quiet years in the country of the Bali bombings.

2023	2024	2025	2026*
0	0	0	0

Terrorist bombings or armed attacks by terrorist networks. *To November 2026. Last attack: suicide bombing at Polsek Astanaanyar, Bandung, 7 December 2022.

THE CONTRAST

202

people killed in one night in Bali, 12 October 2002. Over 1970–2016 the Global Terrorism Database records **733 incidents** and **1,214 deaths** in Indonesia.

QUIET IS NOT SAFE

Suspects arrested by Densus 88:

2023	147
2024	55
2025	51

About 27 attack plans stopped in two years; 11 more arrests in six provinces in October 2026. The threat has not gone. It has moved.

How did we get here?

Not by luck, and not in one step — by facing six generations of terrorists over seventy years.

> ***Zero is not the end of terrorism. It is the result of a long, often late, learning process.***

II · SEVENTY YEARS AT A GLANCE

Six generations, six schools, one idea.

Gen	Period	School	Signature	Indonesia's answer
Root	1949–62	Jungle	Darul Islam revolt; Cikini grenades (1957)	Soldiers + villagers
1	1970s–85	Underground	Secret cells; Woyla hijacking (1981)	Military intelligence, Subversion Law
2	1985–93	Afghanistan	Classmates with a global address book; JI founded 1993	— (leaders abroad)
3	**1994–2004**	**Mindanao, Ambon, Poso**	**Mass bombings: Christmas 2000, Bali 2002, Marriott, embassy**	**Choice 1: the law — 2003 law, Densus 88, courts**
4	2005–13	Splinters	Aceh camp, Poso fighters; police targeted	BNPT (2010); talking to prisoners and families
5	**2014–19**	**Syria**	**ISIS brand; Thamrin 2016; Surabaya families 2018**	**Choice 2: prevention — 2018 law**
6	2020–	Phone	No camp, no leader; children online	Fight the idea: deradicalisation, faith, reintegration





Figure 1. People killed in core terrorist attacks per year, 1949–2026, with generations shaded. Amber band: 2023–2026, zero attacks. Source: LAB45 dataset of major incidents (core attacks only).

> ***The schools changed. The idea stayed the same.***

III · THE ROOT — DARUL ISLAM AND CIKINI, 1949–1962

We beat the fighters. We did not beat the idea.

Four years after independence, in **1949**, a group called **Darul Islam** declared an Islamic state and took up arms against the new Republic. The revolt spread from West Java to Central Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh and South Kalimantan, and lasted thirteen years.



Map 1. The root: Darul Islam revolt zones, 1949–1965, and the attacks on President Sukarno. Zones are approximate.

30 NOVEMBER 1957 · CIKINI, JAKARTA

Indonesia's first modern terrorist attack. Five grenades were thrown at President Sukarno at a school celebration. Sukarno lived. Nine people died, many of them children; 48 were injured.

1949–1962 · THE ANSWER

Soldiers — and villagers. The army and villagers walked together through the mountains in human chains (*pagar betis*), cutting the rebels off from food and people. Kartosoewirjo was captured in 1962; the revolt ended.

Defeated

the armed revolt, its leaders and its territory

Survived

the idea — underground, waiting for the next generation

> ***Lesson 1: winning the war is not the same as winning against the idea.***


IV · GENERATIONS ONE AND TWO — FROM SECRET CELLS TO THE AFGHAN SCHOOL

Repression at home opened a door to the world.

1
1970s–85

Secret cells

Under the New Order, the first generation worked in small, secret groups. In 1981, some of them hijacked a Garuda plane (the Woyla).
Indonesia's answer: military intelligence and very strong laws. This kept them quiet at home — but pushed their leaders abroad.



Map 2. Generations one and two: the 1981 Woyla hijack route, exile to Malaysia (1985), the Afghan–Pakistan camps, and the return as a network.

2
1985–93

The Afghan school


Most Indonesians arrived too late to fight the Soviets. So they went to school. They came home as classmates, with friends all over the world — and in 1993 founded **Jemaah Islamiyah**.
Indonesia's answer: none at first — the leaders were abroad, beyond the reach of the state.

> ***Lesson 2: local terrorism became global through a proxy war of the great powers.***

V · GENERATION THREE — THE BOMBERS, 1994–2004

Bali forced the first big choice: the law, not war.

In 1998 Suharto fell and Indonesia became a democracy — but for a short time it had no law against terrorism. The leaders came home. Conflicts in Ambon and Poso gave them new members and a reason to fight. Trained in Afghanistan and in the camps of Mindanao, the third generation began to bomb.



Map 3. Generation three: bombing sites, communal conflict zones, and the training camps in Mindanao.

Date	Attack	Killed
24 Dec 2000	Christmas Eve church bombings, about 11 cities	~19
12 Oct 2002	**Bali: Paddy's Pub, Sari Club, near US consulate**	**202**
5 Aug 2003	JW Marriott, Jakarta	12
9 Sep 2004	Australian Embassy, Jakarta	9

CHOICE 1 · 2002–2003

The law. An emergency regulation after Bali, then a new anti-terrorism law in 2003. A special police team — Densus 88. Police found the evidence; courts made the decisions.

Before

Soldiers fought rebels

After

Police and judges fought bombers

> ***Lesson 3: a democracy fights terrorism best with its own law — evidence, courts and legitimacy.***

VI · GENERATION FOUR — THE SMALL GROUPS, 2005–2013


From arrests to talking.

4
2005–13

The small groups

Under pressure, Jemaah Islamiyah broke into pieces: hotel bombers in 2009, a training camp in Aceh in 2010, fighters in the mountains of Poso. Now they mostly attacked the police.

Indonesia's answer: a national counter-terrorism agency, BNPT (2010) — and talking with prisoners, their wives and their children.



Map 4. Generation four: attacks 2005–2013 (LAB45 dataset), the Aceh camp and the Poso hideouts. Circle size reflects deaths.

When	What	Answer
Jul 2009	JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton, Jakarta — 7 killed	Noordin Top tracked and killed, Sep 2009
Feb 2010	**Training camp in Aceh's Jantho hills uncovered**	**Dozens arrested; BNPT created the same year**
Apr 2011	Suicide bomb at a police mosque, Cirebon	Police become the main target
2012–16	MIT fighters in the Poso mountains	Long police–military operations

Arrest the network

Talk with prisoners

Reach wives and children

Lesson 4: arrests alone are not enough.

VII · GENERATION FIVE — ISIS, 2014–2019


From reacting to preventing.

5
2014–19

ISIS

ISIS declared a caliphate in 2014; the fifth generation followed the new name. Hundreds of Indonesians went to Syria. At home, an ISIS-linked group attacked Jakarta (Thamrin, 2016). In Surabaya in 2018, whole families — fathers, mothers and their own children — blew themselves up at churches.

Indonesia's answer: Choice 2: a new law in 2018 to act before an attack — against planning, training and joining terror groups abroad, always through the courts.



Map 5. Generation five: travel to the ISIS caliphate in Syria and Iraq, Marawi (2017), and attacks at home.

We stopped waiting. We started preventing.

From reacting after an attack to acting before one — always through the courts.

Lesson 5: prevention must be built into the law itself.

VIII · WHAT CONNECTS THEM — THE CENTRE OF GRAVITY

Not a person. Not a group. An idea.

Soldiers talk about the **centre of gravity**: the thing that gives an enemy its strength. Six generations had different leaders, groups and schools. What connects them is a violent, extreme idea.




Figure 2. Seven decades, one centre of gravity. Each generation was a new host for the same idea.

1 Divides believers

It says other Muslims are not real Muslims.

2 Rejects the nation

It says our country and Pancasila are wrong.

3 Erases borders

It wants one religious state with no borders.

4 Sanctifies killing

It says killing is a religious duty.

> ***This idea is not Islam. In the country with the most Muslims in the world, it is Muslims who say no to it most strongly.***

IX · GENERATION SIX — THE PHONE GENERATION, 2020–


No camp, no leader, no country to travel to.

132

children found used by terrorist groups **online**, first half of 2026.

THE SIXTH ANSWER

Go after the centre of gravity itself: the idea. For the first time, counter-terrorism aims not only at fighters and networks but at the ideology that makes new ones.



Map 6. Generation six: the last network attacks (2020–2022). Since then the threat has no geographic centre — recruitment runs through phones across the country.

In prison

- Hard-core leaders kept apart
- Religious teachers, psychologists and former terrorists answer the idea point by point

Going home

- A job
- Family
- A community that accepts them

In every village

- Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah answer the idea with faith

LAMONGAN · EAST JAVA

The bomber's brother. A brother of the Bali bombers was part of that world. Today he runs a foundation for peace that helps former fighters start a new life. A former terrorist is often the best teacher: he knows the road, and where it ends.

JUNE 2024

Jemaah Islamiyah closes itself down. The group behind Bali disbanded and promised loyalty to the Republic — the result of years of patient talks, not force alone.

Lesson 6: we did not only break the network. We weakened the idea.

X · HOW WE GOT TO ZERO

Seventy years one step behind — until we fought the idea.




Figure 3. Each big change in counter-terrorism came after a major attack (dashed lines): Bali → the 2003 law; ISIS and Surabaya → the 2018 law.

The law
not war

Prevention
not reaction

Faith
against the idea

Era	Terrorist	Answered with
1949–62	Rebels	Soldiers
1966–98	Secret cells	Intelligence
2002–17	Bombers and splinters	Police and courts
2018–	**ISIS and the phone generation**	**Prevention + fighting the idea**


BUT ZERO DOES NOT MEAN SAFE

The danger has moved online. Police still arrest people every year. The threat has not gone; it has moved — and no country can keep zero alone.

XI · REALISM ANALYSIS — STRUCTURAL REALISM AND TERRORISM

The iron cage — and the gaps between its bars.

Structural realism starts from one condition: there is no world government above states. In this anarchy, every great power must provide for its own security, and the search for security makes great powers compete, whatever their intentions. John Mearsheimer, in his fiftieth-anniversary essay for *International Security*, calls this "the iron cage of international anarchy": security competition is "hardwired" into the system and will not disappear. States still cooperate, but only when cooperation does not shift the balance of power against them; they care about relative, not only absolute, gains. Terrorist groups are not poles of the system, yet the system shapes the space in which they operate.



GP = great power · ▲ = terror network moving through the gaps

Figure 1. Mearsheimer's iron cage of anarchy: great powers compete inside; terrorist networks exploit the gaps (LAB45 extension).

Gap 1 · Attention

Rivalry pulls budgets, satellites and analysts toward other states. Counter-terrorism becomes a lower priority.

Gap 2 · Space

Rivalry produces proxy wars, frozen conflicts and weak states — Syria, Afghanistan, the Sahel — where networks regroup.

Gap 3 · Trust

Sharing intelligence can expose sources; lists can be misused. When rivalry gets hotter, information sharing gets colder.

HYPOTHESES

H1 When power is concentrated or a common enemy exists, multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation deepens.

H2 When power is divided among rival great powers, consensus on counter-terrorism weakens and debates over definition, method and money intensify.

H3 Cooperation that does not affect the balance of power — "neutral public goods" — survives rivalry better than military or alliance-based cooperation. The cage does not create terrorism; it creates the conditions for it to spread.

TERMS

Structural realism explains state behaviour by the structure of the system — anarchy and the distribution of power — not by leaders or regimes. **Iron cage:** Mearsheimer's image of great powers locked in permanent security competition. **Relative gains:** states ask not only "will we both gain?" but "who gains more?"

XII · GLOBAL TERRORISM — DATA AND MAP, 1946–2024

From hijacked airliners to truck bombs: eighty years of terror.

The map plots 27 landmark and mass-casualty attacks by non-state actors since 1945, sized by widely reported death tolls. The deadliest attacks after 2003 cluster in the Middle East, South Asia and the Horn of Africa — where great-power wars and proxy conflicts hollowed out states: the gaps between the bars made visible.




Figure 3. Major terrorist attacks worldwide, 1946–2024. Circle area proportional to deaths (approximate, widely cited figures). Basemap: Natural Earth via world-atlas. LAB45 compilation.

Year	Attack	Deaths	Year	Attack	Deaths
1946	King David Hotel, Jerusalem	**91**	2005	London 7/7	**52**
1972	Munich Olympics	**17**	2007	Qahtaniya, Sinjar	**796**
1980	Bologna station	**85**	2008	Mumbai	**166**
1983	Beirut barracks	**307**	2014	Camp Speicher, Tikrit	**1,500**
1985	Air India 182 (off Ireland)	**329**	2014	Peshawar school	**149**
1988	Lockerbie, Pan Am 103	**270**	2015	Paris	**130**
1993	Bombay bombings	**257**	2016	Karrada, Baghdad	**340**
1995	Oklahoma City	**168**	2017	Mogadishu truck bomb	**587**
1998	Nairobi & Dar es Salaam embassies	**224**	2019	Christchurch mosques	**51**
2001	New York & Washington, 9/11	**2,977**	2019	Sri Lanka Easter	**269**
2002	Bali	**202**	2023	Southern Israel, 7 October	**1,200**
2002	Moscow theatre siege	**170**	2024	Crocus City Hall, Moscow	**145**
2004	Madrid trains	**193**	2024	Kerman	**95**
2004	Beslan school	**334**			

XIII · GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM REGIME — POLARITY AND COOPERATION, 1970–2026

When power divides, cooperation breaks.

Fifty years of global counter-terrorism follow the distribution of power. Mearsheimer notes that even in the old multipolarity great powers cooperated only "in the shadow of security competition" — when cooperation preserved the balance of power. Under bipolarity, the two blocs could not agree on what terrorism *is*, so they agreed on what terrorists *do*, producing act-based treaties that still work. Under unipolarity after 2001, one superpower made counter-terrorism global and binding, but often in the language of war. In 2014, ISIS gave rival great powers a common enemy. In 2026, under multipolarity, consensus broke.




Figure 2. Stylised level of multilateral consensus on counter-terrorism by period (LAB45 assessment).

Period	Polarity	Key instrument	Mode
1970s	Bipolar	Sectoral conventions: hijacking (1970–71), protected persons (1973), hostages (1979)	Agree on acts, not identities
2001	Unipolar	UNSC Res. 1373 — binding on all states; CTC created	Global, but war-framed
2006	Unipolar	UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, four pillars, consensus	Institutionalised
2014	Common enemy (ISIS)	UNSC Res. 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters; 1267 sanctions	Great powers align
2026	Multipolar	Ninth review forced to a vote, 140–3–1	Consensus breaks

THREE DEBATES THAT ALWAYS RETURN

Definition
Political

Who is a terrorist? Self-determination, occupation and separatism have blocked a comprehensive convention since 1996.

Method
Security

Police and courts, or armies and drones? Afghanistan, Iraq and the Sahel show the limits of force.

Money
Economic

Who pays, and who controls the rules — sanctions lists, grey lists, voluntary UN funds?

> ***Great-power competition does not create these debates. It makes them louder.***

XIII-A · GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM REGIME — THE 2026 RUPTURE

Arguments about words were arguments about power.

Negotiations between March and June 2026 revealed that states no longer agreed on the purpose of the review. Some sought to expand operational counter-terrorism — emerging technologies, financing, border security. Others sought more weight on human rights, balance across the four pillars and identity-based violence. On 8 June, the United States circulated a much shorter alternative draft; the co-facilitators, Finland and Morocco, fell back on a technical rollover of the 2023 text.

State	Vote	Stated reasons (explanations of vote)
United States	**No**	Text "bloated, outdated"; ignored its red lines (2030 Agenda, gender, DEI); UNOCT "empire-building". Requested the vote.
Israel	**No**	A technical rollover of 2023; long, repetitive; lacks accountability and modernisation; its proposals not reflected.
Argentina	**No**	A real review is needed for effectiveness; avoid duplicated and overlapping mandates.
Egypt (OIC)	**Yes**	Regrets broken consensus; OIC proposals on Islamophobia, desecration and attacks on mosques rejected.
Iran	**Yes**	Supports multilateralism; proposals on incitement against Muslims excluded; disassociates from gender language.
Russia	**Yes**	Streamline the text; focus on online financing, ICT recruitment, arms supply, foreign fighters; cites SCO convention.
South Africa	**Yes**	Rollover a "lost opportunity", but the four pillars remain a workable framework.

Table 1. Selected explanations of vote, UN General Assembly, 1 July 2026. Source: UN transcript GA/80/95.

Who sets the agenda

A 170-plus-paragraph text against drafts of 14 or 55 paragraphs.

Whose threats count

Islamophobia and right-wing violence versus emerging technology and financing.

Who pays

UNOCT's dependence on voluntary funds and the demand for accountability.

> ***The split was not about one country. Almost every delegation was dissatisfied with something — a structural, not a personal, rupture.***

XIV · CLOSING — HOW TO PREVENT THE SEVENTH GENERATION

Three rings, one shield: national, regional, global.

Each generation found a gap: a jungle, an exile, a foreign camp, a war zone, a phone. The seventh will look for the gap between levels. No single level can close it alone — the rings must work together.




Figure 6. Three rings around the next generation: each level adds what the others cannot do.

Method	National	Regional	Global
Law	Police lead, courts decide; act before an attack	Common legal ground (ASEAN convention, SCO, CIS, AU)	UN strategy back to consensus
Money	Financial intelligence on every case	Fast exchange between financial units	FATF rules for all, used for no bloc
The idea	**Deradicalisation, reintegration, NU and Muhammadiyah**	**Share what works: prisons, returnees, families**	**Counter the ideology without blaming a faith**
People	Track returnees and released prisoners	Watch-lists across borders and seas	Interpol channels open to all states
Children online	**Schools, parents, police online**	**Regional content-takedown cooperation**	**A global compact with tech companies**

National
closes the gap at home

Regional
closes the gap at the border

Global
closes the gap online and in money

No blocs

Cooperation against terrorism must stay open even when great powers compete — and no one should ask which side we are on.

> ***Indonesia faced six generations of terrorists. Too often, we were late. Together, let us not be late for the seventh.***

Six Generations of Terrorism

How Indonesia Got to Zero, 1949–2026

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This deck was researched and prepared with the assistance of Anthropic Claude Opus 5.5.