

Tantangan Demokrasi Kontemporer dan Solusinya

Firman Noor

(Pusat Riset Politik-BRIN)

26 Agustus 2022



Kondisi Demokrasi Kontemporer



KONTEKS POLITIK KONTEMPORER (+)

- (o) **Pemilu berjalan dengan damai**
- (o) **Pergantian kepemimpinan yang teratur**
- (o) **Tidak ada lagi partai penguasa**
- (o) **Militer tidak lagi aktif berada dalam panggung kekuasaan.**
- (o) **Desentralisasi kekuasaan**
- (o) **Partai-partai bebas untuk didirikan.**
- (o) **Ada kebebasan relatif bagi media massa.**


KONTEKS POLITIK KONTEMPORER (-)

- (O) Lemahnya pelaksanaan checks and balances
- (O) Meredupnya peran dan eksistensi civil society
- (O) Kepemimpinan nasional dengan komitmen demokrasi yang rendah
- (O) Lemahnya penerapan nilai-nilai demokrasi
- (O) Penegakan hukum yang tebang pilih
- (O) Memudarnya partisipasi dan kebebasan berekspresi
- (O) Memudarnya citra positif partai politik
- (O) Maraknya politik uang terkait dengan kontestasi elektoral dan eksekusinya

DEMOCRACY INDEX IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (EIU 2010 & 2020)



Chart 1: Democracy Index 2019, global map by regime type




Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.

INDONESIA DEMOCRACY (THE FREEDOM HOUSE)

Years	Political Rights	Civil Liberties	Score	Status
2014	30/40	34/60	64/100	Partly Free
2015	30/40	34/60	64/100	Partly Free
2016	31/40	34/60	65/100	Partly Free
2017	31/40	34/60	65/100	Partly Free
2018	30/40	34/60	64/100	Partly Free
2019	30/40	32/60	62/100	Partly Free
2020	30/40	31/60	61/100	Partly Free

World Governance Indicators Indonesia 2006-2019




INDEKS DEMOKRASI INDONESIA (IDI)



Skor Demokrasi mengalami penurunan dari **75.6 (2019)** menjadi **74.3 (2020)**

INDIKATOR 24-30 SEPTEMBER 2020

Menurut Ibu/Bapak, apakah Indonesia saat ini menjadi lebih demokratis, kurang demokratis, atau tetap sama dalam beberapa tahun terakhir?... (%)



Indeks Demokrasi Indonesia (IDI) Menurut Variabel 2018-2020

< back

excel

Data series subyek **Politik dan Keamanan** juga dapat diakses melalui **Fitur Tabel Dinamis**.

Data Series : **2018-2020** 2015-2017 2012-2014 2009-2011

Search:

Variabel Indeks Demokrasi ↑↓	Indeks Demokrasi Indonesia (IDI) Menurut Variabel		
	2018 ↑↓	2019 ↑↓	2020 ↑↓
Kebebasan Berkumpul dan Berserikat	82,35	78,03	86,79
Kebebasan Berpendapat	66,17	64,29	56,06
Kebebasan Berkeyakinan	82,86	83,03	86,57
Kebebasan dari Diskriminasi	91,77	92,35	90,88
Hak Memilih dan Dipilih	75,77	79,27	79,41
Partisipasi Politik dalam Pengambilan Keputusan dan Pengawasan	54,28	56,72	54,00
Pemilu yang Bebas dan Adil	95,48	85,75	85,75
Peran DPRD	58,92	61,74	64,94
Peran Partai Politik	82,10	80,62	75,66
Peran Birokrasi Pemerintah Daerah	55,74	62,58	59,72
Peran Peradilan yang Independen	90,72	93,66	90,17

Sumber: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2009-2020




REORGANISING POWER IN INDONESIA
THE POLITICS OF OLIGARCHY IN AN AGE OF MARKETS
RICHARD ROBISON AND VEDI R. HADIZ

Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia

Edited by
Marco Bünte and Andreas Ufen



Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series






OLIGARCHY

Jeffrey A. Winters

CAMBRIDGE





CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA

V38/2
AUG 2018

ISEAS YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE

ROUNDTABLE

The 2016 Philippine Presidential Election
*Ramon C. Casiple, Duncan McCargo, Edward Aspinall,
Michael W. Davidson, Allen Hicken, Meredith L. Weiss,
Bernardo M. Villegas, George N. Manzano and Aileen Baviera*

ARTICLES

Coercing Loyalty: Coalitional Presidentialism and
Party Politics in Jokowi's Indonesia
Marcus Mietzner

"Bamboo Swirling in the Wind":
Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance between
China and the United States
Pongphisoot Busbarat

New Political Space, Old Tensions:
History, Identity and Violence in
Rakhine State, Myanmar
Adam Burke

Japan-India Cooperation and
Abe's Democratic Security Diamond:
Possibilities, Limitations and the
View from Southeast Asia
Lavina Lee and John Lee

BOOK REVIEWS

INDONESIA'S ACCOUNTABILITY TRAP: PARTY CARTELS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER AFTER DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

Dan Slater¹

A CONSOLIDATED PATRIMONIAL DEMOCRACY? DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA

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Paper to be presented at the workshop, 'Post-Cold War Democratization in the Muslim World: Domestic, Regional and Global Trends', Joint Sessions of the European Consortium of Political Research, Granada, 14-19 April 2005

Idolization and "Immediate Help!": Campaigning as if Voters Mattered

On July 14, 2004, just nine days after Indonesia's first-ever direct presidential election, a massive inferno ripped through the impoverished, gang-infested district of Tanah Abang in central Jakarta. Hundreds of dwellings were destroyed and over a thousand Jakartans were rendered homeless. While such catastrophes are nothing unusual in the nation's chaotic capital, the political responses suggested that some interesting changes are afoot in Indonesia's fledgling electoral democracy. The next day, presidential frontrunner Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) took a break from watching his burgeoning vote totals at the five-star Borobudur Hotel to visit Tanah Abang's fire victims. Since he had just clinched pole position in Indonesia's run-off presidential election in late September, SBY's public appearance made fantastic copy. The handsome former general comforted distraught families, then crept, head and shoulders protruding through the sunroof of his campaign minivan, through a swarm of star-struck locals. Never mind the knock-off reality-television program screening for talent just a few miles away at the swanky Semanggi shopping complex; here, in one of Jakarta's least swanky settings, appeared to be the true *Indonesian Idol*.

¹ This article draws on a comparative project with Marc Craighead, conversations and collaboration with whom have been invaluable in refining the theoretical arguments presented here. It has also greatly benefited from the thoughtful comments of Jamie Davidson, Dirk Toesma, and an anonymous reviewer at *Indonesia*; the savvy and sensitive editing of Deborah Homber; and generous fieldwork support from the Academy for Educational Development, Emory University, and the Ford Foundation. All translations in the essay (along with any errors and all opinions) are the author's.

Indonesia 78 (October 2004)

Introduction

In the course of the last seven years, the political landscape of Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, has been transformed almost beyond recognition. In May 1998, Indonesia still had a highly centralized authoritarian regime in which there was no effective separation of powers, power in the dominant executive branch was concentrated in the hands of a single person who had held the office of president for the preceding 32 years, political freedoms were extremely limited, elections and the few political parties permitted to compete for popular support in them were strictly controlled, and the military had extensive discretionary powers to intervene in political and other areas of Indonesian life. Meanwhile Indonesia has staged a series of free, fair and extremely peaceful elections for the country's legislature and – for the first time in 2004 – for a popularly-elected president and had several rotations of government. Legislatures and courts are much more independent of the executive than they were under Suharto's 'New Order'. Indonesians enjoy extensive political freedoms. Numerous political parties compete freely for popular support and a wide range of pressure or interest groups and mass media exercise or try to exercise oversight over the behaviour of elected representatives and national and local governments.

In brief, Indonesia has made in a short time and in many respects a remarkable transition from an authoritarian to a democratic political system. Moreover, to the extent that it possesses very few of the traits typically identified as conducive to democratization and has laboured under the after-effects of the profound economic crisis that hit the country in 1997-98, it has achieved this transition very much 'against the odds', defying occasionally bleak, even dire, prognoses that democratization would fail and Indonesia itself would fall apart in an accelerating spiral of inter-communal or inter-cultural violence. Contrary to these pessimistic analyses, Indonesia's new democracy, in my view, has become considerably more stable in the last three or four years. Depending upon how the concept of 'democratic consolidation' is defined and operationalized, Indonesia arguably meanwhile displays numerous attributes of a consolidated democratic political system. Less clear,



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Third International Conference on Social and Political Sciences (ICSPS 2017)

Indonesia: The Dangers of Democratic Regression

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Abstract: For the last decade, comparativists and country experts have praised Indonesia's democratic stability. Free, fair and highly competitive elections are held regularly throughout the country. Indonesia boasts a vibrant civil society and its press is amongst the freest in the region. However, praise for Indonesia's democratic credentials has always been accompanied by significant caveats. Analysts point to systemic corruption and weak rule of law, and conclude that while Indonesia's democracy is stable, it continues to lag on many indicators for democratic quality. In this paper, we reassess the health of Indonesian democracy and point to new signs of fragility and, in some cases, democratic deterioration. Specifically, we look at the rise of a xenophobic and reactionary brand of populist politics, and a sustained illiberal drift in the regulation of civil liberties. We also use polling data to investigate the depth of societal support for democratic institutions and values. The data reveal that, although support for democracy as an abstract value remains high, there is also significant potential for an illiberal coalition that could provide the base for future erosion of democratic institutions.

Keywords: Reformasi, democratic regression, populist, democratic fragility

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1998 Indonesia will celebrate the twenty-year anniversary of the downfall of Soeharto's "New Order" regime and the beginning of the process of *reformasi*. For much of that period, but especially for the last decade, comparativists and country experts have praised Indonesia's democratic stability. Free, fair and highly competitive elections are held regularly throughout the country. Indonesia boasts a vibrant civil society and its press is amongst the freest in the region. Compared to other post-authoritarian polities, Indonesia's democracy appears robust, and we do not find the sort of democratic deterioration seen in countries such as Thailand or the Philippines. Writing after Indonesia's second direct presidential elections in 2009 [1], applauded Indonesia for achieving the status of a "stable democracy – with no obvious threats or potent anti-democratic challenges on the horizon." Diamond also described Indonesia back then as, "a relatively liberal democracy." Most analysts continue to see Indonesia as a comparatively "healthy" democratic bastion, in which public support for democratic government remains amongst the highest and most stable in the East Asian region [2].

Praise for Indonesia's democratic credentials has always been accompanied by significant caveats. Analysts point to systemic corruption and weak rule of law, and conclude that

while Indonesia's democracy is stable, it continues to lag on many indicators for democratic quality [3][4]. A cast of authoritarian-era elites dominate the political landscape, and continue to pursue anti-reformist agendas [3][4][5]. Overall, however, even the most critical observers have been relatively sanguine about Indonesia's democratic trajectory. Throughout the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono presidency (2004-2014), few analysts seriously entertained the notion of authoritarian regression. Mietzner, for example, argued that attempts by anti-reformist elites to undermine Indonesian democracy have largely been checked, "by resistance from a strong civil society" [4], and continued support amongst the Indonesian public for their country's democratic institutions [6][7]. So despite suffering low democratic quality, most analysts agreed that Indonesia's democracy was now stable (if stagnant), relatively liberal, and faced no serious existential threats.

Events and trends since 2014, however, have cast doubt upon this analytical consensus. In this paper, we reassess the health of Indonesian democracy and point to new signs of fragility and, in some cases, democratic deterioration. Specifically, we look at the rise of a xenophobic and reactionary brand of populist politics, and a sustained illiberal drift in the regulation of civil liberties. We also use polling data to investigate the depth of societal support for democratic institutions and values. The data reveal that, although support for democracy as an abstract value remains high, there is also significant potential for an illiberal coalition that could provide the base for future erosion of democratic institutions.

The paper is divided into three parts. In the first section, we briefly summarise the rise of a nativist and sectarian brand of political populism; in the second we analyse potential bases of support for the nascent trends of democratic backsliding that we identify; in the third we speculate on the sources of these challenges.

II. THE POPULIST CHALLENGE

One of the defining characteristics of the wave of democratic regression that has been taking place worldwide over the last decade or so is that threats to democracy now largely emanate from inside rather than outside of democratic governments. Events like the recent coups in Thailand, in which authoritarian actors move to overthrow a country's democratic system and suspend its constitutional order, are now relatively rare. A much more common pattern of democratic regression occurs when a

Jokowi's authoritarian turn



11 October 2018

By Tom Power.

This article was originally published by [New Mandala](#).

Several insightful analyses of Joko Widodo's approach to the presidency have been advanced since he took office. For the most part, these have focused on his overriding preoccupation with domestic economic development, and his lack of a clear ideological orientation in the social and political arenas. [Jacqui Baker has described him](#) as a developmentalist president, who exhibits "impatience with legal complexity" and "illiberal tendencies" consistent with his petite bourgeoisie class origins. Eve Warburton develops this picture, noting his government's "[statist-nationalist ideological orientation](#)" which sees the maintenance of a strong state and stable political landscape essential for the achievement of economic goals, echoing Burhanuddin Muhtadi's assessment that "[Jokowi seems to think of non-economic sectors as secondary or as mere instruments for improving the economy and people's welfare](#)".

Sha



Sub

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- Asiar
- Asiar
- Mast Forei

PROBLEM PEMERINTAHAN DI INDONESIA

Pelemahan
Lembaga Politik
& Pemerintahan

Defisit
Partisipasi
Politik

Resentralisasi
Kewenangan

PELEMAHAN LEMBAGA POLITIK DAN PEMERINTAHAN DEMOKRATIS



DEFISIT PARTISIPASI POLITIK

- Rendahnya akomodasi suara publik dalam penyusunan UU
- Tindakan negara yang represif dan reaktif terhadap aspirasi (kritik)
- Gugatan pejabat negara terhadap suara aktifis
- Pemangkasan interupsi di sidang parlemen

RESENTRALISASI KEWENANGAN DAN URUSAN DAERAH

Sentralisasi Otonomi khusus (Papua)

Status Daerah (RUU IKN)

Kecenderungan UU yang memperlemah otonomi daerah

DEFISIT DEMOKRASI DAN LEGITIMASI DI INDONESIA

STATE WEAKNESS



REPRESENTATION WEAKNESS

ACCOUNTABILITY WEAKNESS

STATE WEAKNESS DICERMINKAN OLEH

Disharmoni Penggunaan Kekuasaan

baik secara horizontal antar lembaga legislatif dan eksekutif, maupun secara vertikal antara level kekuasaan eksekutif

Lemahnya Kelembagaan Pemerintahan

(birokrasi) untuk menopang pemenuhan kebutuhan dan harapan masyarakat

Lemahnya Kapabilitas Kepemimpinan

untuk memberikan visi dan dukungan politik bagi penyelenggaraan pemerintahan yang baik

ACCOUNTABILITY WEAKNESS



Penggunaan kekuasaan yang seringkali tidak sesuai dengan tujuan-tujuan bernegara

Penggunaan sumber daya negara yang tidak dapat dipertanggungjawabkan

REPRESENTATION WEAKNESS



Kegagalan lembaga-lembaga negara mencapai konsensus



Ketidakmampuan parpol dan politisi mewakili rakyat



Ketidakmatangan society dan civic self organization



OLIGARCHY

A FEW PEOPLE THAT HOLD POWER.

“Oligarki merupakan anti-tesis dari demokrasi, karena nilai-nilai utama demokrasi seperti persamaan hak, keterbukaan/transparansi, dan yang terutama kedaulatan rakyat, tidak terpenuhi di dalamnya”.

PERSEBARAN PEBISNIS DI DPR



TOTAL PEBISNIS DPR:

318

ANGGOTA

5-6 orang dari 10 Anggota DPR ialah Pebisnis




PERSENTASE

PEBISNIS




NON-PEBISNIS





POSISI DAN STATUS KERJA DI PERUSAHAAN

POSISI DI PERUSAHAAN




STATUS KEAKTIFAN DALAM PERUSAHAAN





*“...the formal structure of electoral democracy **can coexist** with oligarchic rule, most often where democracy exists in minimalist or procedural terms...” (Ford dan Pepinsky, 2014, hal.2)*

Power Exercise Pattern



PARADOKS DEMOKRASI DI INDONESIA



Praktik Korupsi

Praktik Pemilihan Langsung

Biaya politik yang mahal dan kualitas demokrasi yang tidak bisa menjamin baik

High Political Cost

Adanya keharusan membayar/mengganti *political cost* melalui berbagai proses pemerintahan, pembangunan, dan layanan publik

Berbagai praktik korupsi tersebut, menjadikan demokrasi di Indonesia lebih bersifat prosedural daripada demokrasi yang berbasis substansi dan hasil (Result-oriented Democracy/RoD)

253

Gubernur/Walikota/Bupati

503

Anggota DPR dan DPRD

27

Kepala Lembaga/Menteri

5

Ketua Partai Politik

2.496

Aparatur Sipil Negara



Dampak bagi Pembangunan Ekonomi

- Pengeluaran Negara (*Public spending*) lebih banyak menguntungkan pemilik modal, *not the poor*
- Keuangan negara gagal menghasilkan pelayanan publik bagi masyarakat miskin
- Kualitas Pelayanan publik untuk orang miskin sangat buruk
- Ketimpangan antar kaya-miskin masih tinggi
- Kekayaan negara tidak dinikmati oleh bangsanya sendiri

POTENSI DAMPAK





Post Democracy

(Colin Crouch, 2004)

- Eksistensi lembaga dan prosedur demokrasi sebagai sebuah kerangka yang formal semata (*formal shell*)
- Keterlibatan terbatas rakyat banyak, demokrasi berada di tangan elite (*all about elites*) → *cooptated democracy*
- Kecenderungan *elite and people ignorance* → *no common ground* → *undiscussed issues* → lemahnya *party id*
- Penggunaan cara-cara populis dan artifisial (*post-truth*) → Pertarungan idea atau dialog tidak diperlukan → berkembangnya *political advertising* dan perang proxy (buzzer, influencer, etc)
- Terjadinya *personalized party*/"firma politik" → partai milik elite
- Pelemahan civil society → terserapnya aktivis NGO dalam kekuasaan.
- Globalisasi mempengaruhi kondisi politik & perilaku elite (*who's behind?*) → privatisasi, posisi oligark yang kuat dalam keputusan politik → *triple alliance?*
- Hilangnya penghormatan terhadap institusi, prosesi dan nilai demokrasi

Beberapa Solusi

Perbaikan Regulasi terkait Pelembagaan Partai dan Kualitas Lembaga Demokrasi

**Strengthening
party
independency**

**Establishing
party ideology**

**Consolidating
internal party
democracy**


**Implementing
merit system**



Peningkatan Kualitas Pendidikan Politik dan Pemberdayaan Ekonomi Rakyat




**Through
Formal
Education**



**Through
Informal
Institutions**



**Through
Political
Institutions**



**Developmen
t of People
Prosperity**

Pemeliharaan Nilai-Nilai Dasar Demokrasi (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018)



Tolerance Acknowledgement Other Parties as “Legitimate Rival”

Refrain Not To Easily Utilize “Institutional Privilege”

Patient



PEMILU YANG BERINTEGRITAS

Apabila proses pemungutan dan penghitungan suara

- **Diselenggarakan berdasarkan asas-asas pemilu yang demokratik yaitu langsung, umum, bebas, rahasia, jujur, adil, transparan dan akuntabel**
- **Dilakukan secara akurat, bebas dari kesalahan dan manipulasi**
- **Diselenggarakan oleh penyelenggara pemilu berdasarkan aturan dan Kode Etik Penyelenggara Pemilu**
- **Diawasi oleh peserta pemilu, lembaga pemantau pemilu dan pemilih, serta media massa**
- **Ditegakkan secara konsisten, imparial dan tepat waktu**

(ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2011, Surbakti, Supriyanto, Asy'ari, 2011)

FAKTOR PENGUAT HASIL PEMILU

- Munculnya Kandidat Alternatif → Tidak sekadar memainkan populisme
- Munculnya Tema-Tema Segar → Brand new style and thought. Komitmen demokrasi yang kuat
- Sikap Partai dan Koalisi → vision rather than popularity Lingkungan politik yang sehat → rakyat yg tahu pencitraan dan kritis



Penguatan Civil Society



**Civil Rights
And
Liberty
Protection**

**Freedom Of
Expression
Preservation**

**Abuse Of
Power
Reduction**

Rule of laws

Rules Of Law



Strengthening law enforcement institutions

Budget, Etc.

Purifying law enforcement from political interest

Member Selection, Etc

Kepemimpinan di Era Demokrasi



Kepemimpinan yang Inklusif



Kepemimpinan yang Aspiratif



Kepemimpinan yang Partisipatif



Kepemimpinan dengan Jiwa Pendidik



Kepemimpinan yang mendorong pengautan akar demokrasi



Kepemimpinan yang berkomitmen menegakkan hukum



Kepemimpinan yang berkomitmen memberantas korupsi



Kepemimpinan yang mendorong penguatan partai

Solusi membatasi oligarki

A. Penciptaan sebuah EKOSISTEM yang bercirikan:

- Solidaritas komunitas
- Penghormatan atas hukum
- Penedeapanan etika politik, bukan sekadar hak politik
- Budaya demokratik-rasional
- Penghargaan atas kebebasan berekspresi
- Self-sufficient
- Berkesadaran politik

Solusi membatasi oligarki

B. Penciptaan REGULASI:

- Menopang terciptanya “politik biaya murah”
- Penguatan kemandirian finansial dan ideologisasi partai politik
- Pembatasan penguasaan hajat hidup orang banyak oleh segelintir orang
- Berorientasi “ekonomi distributif” bukan “ekonomi dominatif”
- Good Governance and Clean-Transparent Government
- Memperkuat masyarakat sipil dan oposisi
- Pembatasan peran politik kalangan terindikasi oligark



Thank you